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The Policy Papers Series
The Robert Schuman Centre's Policy Paper Series adds a further dimension 
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Ten Central and East European countries (CEECs) applied for EU membership 
between 1994 and 1996: Bulgaria, Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All ten have signed special 
"Europe" (association) agreements with the EU, and all participate in the EU’s 
"pre-accession strategy", which is to help prepare them for eventual membership.
Enlargement will depend on whether the applicant meets certain conditions, as 
set out in the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council conclusions. Because not 
all applicants will meet the conditions, enlargement will take place in "stages", 
to some countries before others.
Decisions on enlargement are being taken this year. The Commission presented 
its opinions on all the applications in July 1997, following the conclusion of the 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) in Amsterdam in June. In its communication 
’Agenda 2000’, the Commission recommended that accession negotiations begin 
with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.2 The 
December European Council could then decide to open negotiations with 
suitable applicant countries.
Enlargement in stages would allow the EU to manage enlargement with less 
difficulties and to better maintain the momentum of integration as it enlarges. 
It would give the less advanced CEECs more time to prepare for accession and 
for the competitive pressures of the internal market, which is in their interest and 
could mean enlargement would be less costly. But enlargement in stages will 
have economic, political, and security implications for those CEECs left out of 
the first stage. The gap between the economies of the excluded CEECs and those 
joining the EU will widen as the new member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe enjoy the greater economic advantages associated with EU membership. 
The excluded CEECs could feel isolated and marginalised, which could have 
destabilising effects on their political systems and ultimately European security. 
The implications of enlargement in stages need to be considered, and soon, since 
these issues will certainly arise later in 1997.
In May 1997, the newly established European University Institute Robert 
Schuman Centre Working Group on Eastern Enlargement, chaired by Horst G.
I. The Importance of the Issue of Enlargement in Stages
2 The Agenda 2000 report was published in July 1997, subsequent to the Working 




























































































Krenzler, met to discuss the problems of enlargement in stages and to consider 
ways of managing it. The Working Group’s discussion was based on two 
background reports: Susan Senior Nello and Karen E. Smith, "The European 
Union and Central and Eastern Europe: The Implications of Enlargement in 
Stages"3, and Mircea Cosea, "Are There Sufficient Reasons for Romania’s 
Admittance to the European Union in the First Stage? Consequences of a 
Possible Postponement". This report, published under the responsibility of its 
chairman, is based on the Working Group’s discussion.
II. How and When to Distinguish among the CEEC Applicants?
The Opening of Membership Negotiations
As it is clear that some CEECs will join the EU before others, a major question 
arises: should the EU begin negotiations with all of the CEEC applicants at the 
same time (the "regatta option"), or only with those CEECs that meet the 
membership criteria? The advantages of the regatta option are that it would 
signal the EU’s intention to enlarge to all of the CEECs, even if some join 
before others. The exclusion of some CEECs right from the beginning of the 
enlargement process could provoke feelings of isolation, and might prove to be 
a very difficult decision to communicate to those countries.
The members of the Working Group generally felt, however, that the 
disadvantages of the regatta option outweighed these advantages. Negotiations 
should begin only with those CEECs that are considered ready and able to join. 
Differentiation among the CEECs will have to place at some stage, and it would 
be preferable to do so sooner rather than later. To differentiate after the opening 
of negotiations by putting some negotiations "on hold", as suggested by some 
members of the Working Group, would have the same effect of provoking 
frustrations and would be perhaps even more politically difficult.
A consequence of conducting negotiations with all the CEECs would be a 
negotiation process determined in its pace by the slowest "boat". All then would 
find themselves on a "slow track" to accession. Conducting so many negotiations 
at the same time would also strain the Union’s negotiating capacity. Politically, 
opening negotiations with all ten CEECs would make it extremely difficult to
3 Published as The Consequences o f Eastern Enlargement o f the European Union in 





























































































exclude Turkey, which applied for membership in 1987 but does not yet meet 
the conditions.
The decision not to begin negotiations with some of the candidates makes it all 
the more important to strengthen the feeling of belonging to the European family 
for these candidates, by implementing an appropriate strategy (see part IV 
below). One such option is the French suggestion of a Standing Conference of 
the Union with all candidates, separate from the process of negotiations, which 
was also taken up in the Commission’s Agenda 2000 report.4
Distinguishing among the CEECs
The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council set several general conditions for 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe:
the applicant state must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities;
the applicant state must have a functioning market economy with the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Community;
the applicant state must be able to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of economic and political union; and
the EU must be able to absorb new members and maintain the momentum 
of integration.5
The Working Group discussed the more specific criteria that could be used to 
determine whether the CEECs meet these conditions. Because there are so many 
potential indicators, the Union will enjoy a certain amount of discretion in 
deciding which applicant countries should join when. One suggestion by the 
Working Group for determining whether the CEEC can take on membership 
obligations would be to set a maximum transition period (no longer than 12
4 Volume II, part IV.





























































































years, the original EEC transition period), and consider whether the country can 
make the transition to full membership within that length of time.
The Political Criteria
There are essentially three "political" conditions for EU membership. The 
applicants must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. They 
must be able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political union. In addition, the Union would have to be able to 
absorb new members and maintain the momentum of integration.
Acceptance of the so-called acquis politique is included in the membership 
obligations, and encompasses the Maastricht Treaty provisions on Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, as well as statements and policies already agreed 
in the framework of foreign policy cooperation. This should not pose any 
specific problems, and may reassure outsiders (particularly those countries with 
whom the acceding CEECs have had tense relations) that the EU’s current 
approach would continue along more or less the same lines.
Assessing whether the applicants adhere to the aim of political union and 
whether the EU can enlarge successfully will be, to a considerable degree, a 
subjective decision. There does not seem to be a clear idea within the EU itself 
about what the future shape and orientation of an enlarged EU will be. It is 
generally acknowledged that more "flexibility" is necessary in an enlarged 
Union, but the exact form that flexibility will take remains undefined, in spite 
of the Amsterdam European Council conclusions.
The condition of stable democratic institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and 
respect for human and minority rights could be assessed using several yardsticks, 
including a list of factors compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development6, and the principles of the Council of Europe Framework for 
the Protection of National Minorities7. The Working Group agreed that the 
stability of rules, stability of institutions and development of civil society should 
be taken into consideration, as should the extent to which human and minority 
rights are protected in the applicant state.
6 See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (no date), Political Aspects o f 
the Mandate o f the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.




























































































The state of relations between the applicant countries, and between the applicant 
countries and other countries in the region, will also be an important 
consideration in any enlargement decision, although it is not a formal 
membership condition. The EU has encouraged the CEECs to cooperate with 
each other, as in the Pact for Stability in Europe, with some degree of success, 
but the EU would like to see further efforts by the CEECs.8 The issue remains 
a concern, given the implications of enlargement in stages for relations between 
the newly enlarged EU and outsiders. The better the relations among the CEECs 
are before enlargement, the less likely it is that the CEECs will perceive EU 
enlargement as a divisive and exclusive process. As the Commission noted in 
Agenda 2000, applicant countries should resolve outstanding border disputes 
before they accede to the Union.
Some Working Group participants noted that an additional factor should be 
taken into account, and that is the question of geopolitical stability. This is 
particularly the case because NATO decided in July 1997 to enlarge to the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The impact of being excluded from the 
EU could be magnified because of the limited extent of NATO enlargement. For 
these geopolitical reasons, Estonia has often been cited as a possible candidate 
for early EU membership, since it would not join NATO. The effects on 
regional stability might have to become a consideration in EU enlargement 
decisions, depending on the impact of NATO enlargement.
The Economic Criteria
Progress in creating a functioning market economy
There was general consensus among the Working Group that the indicators 
chosen to assess how far the CEECs have developed a functioning market- 
oriented economy should relate both to the macroeconomic performance of the 
CEECs, and to their success in transition (microeconomic restructuring, 
privatisation and systemic change).
The Maastricht criteria9 were taken as a starting point in the search for
8 There has been much concern that the EU’s encouragement of regional cooperation is 
an attempt to block the CEECs’ accession to the EU because a separate regional grouping 
could serve as an alternative to EU membership. See Kormendy (1992), p 248 and Adameic 
(1993), pp. 24-25.




























































































indicators of macroeconomic performance of the CEECs. However, the 
Maastricht convergence criteria are not accession criteria, and the Working 
Group considered them inappropriate as such on a number of grounds. Not even 
all of the present EU member states can meet them. The Maastricht criteria are 
indicators of macroeconomic performance, and in assessing progress in 
transition, account also has to be taken of microeconomic developments. 
Transition is an ongoing, dynamic process and even if a CEEC meets the 
macroeconomic criteria at a particular moment, this is not necessarily a 
guarantee that it will continue to meet the criteria on a sustainable basis.10
Though the Maastricht criteria may be inappropriate as accession criteria, there 
was agreement in the Working Group that they cannot be ignored in view of the 
obligation of CEECs joining the EU to endorse the ultimate objective of 
economic and monetary union (EMU). Given the time lag before enlargement, 
if EMU proceeds according to the timetable set out in the Maastricht Treaty, it 
is likely to be in Stage 3 when the CEECs at the head of the accession list join. 
As non-participating countries (i.e. with derogations from EMU) during Stage 
3 those countries would none the less be obliged to adopt the acquis of Stage 
2 of EMU and to follow rules relating to fiscal discipline, liberalisation of 
capital movements and the coordination of economic policy, and would have to 
accept the primary objective of price stability. Given the inflationary pressures 
associated with transition, the need to cope with capital movements, and the 
burden imposed by transformation on the budget, these obligations could prove 
difficult to meet. The loss of the exchange rate instrument and of control of
i) Successful candidates must have inflation rates no more than 1.5% above the average 
of the three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the Community.
ii) Long-term interest rates should be no more that 2% above the average of that of the 
three lowest inflation countries. This is to ensure that inflation convergence is lasting, 
because otherwise higher expected future inflation in a country would be reflected in 
higher long-term interest rates.
iii) The exchange rate of the country should remain within the "normal" band of the ERM 
without tension and without initiating depreciation for two years. At the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty the "normal" band referred to the margins of +/-2.25%, but since 
August 1993, in some circles it is now taken to refer to +/-15%.
iv) The public debt of the country must be less than 60% of GDP.
v) The national budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP.
10 As the Christodoulou Report (1996) of the European Parliament (Annex I, p. 17) points 
out, this is particularly likely to be the case if CEECs have not completed structural reforms, 
introduced sound economic and monetary policies and achieved a satisfactory level of 
underlying convergence. As was pointed out in the Working Group discussion, in the context 





























































































monetary policy implied by full participation in EMU could be even more costly 
for the CEECs.
Some of the concepts underlying the Maastricht criteria assume a different 
meaning in transitional and market-oriented economies. The concept of public 
deficit in the Maastricht Treaty refers to central, regional and local government 
as well as social security funds. As Daviddi and Ilzkovitz (1996) point out, the 
budget situation of local and regional governments is often difficult to assess in 
the CEECs. The creation of adequate social safety nets is a central element of 
the transformation process and this could lead to a substantial increase in 
government deficits". A clearer understanding of how privatisation has been 
taken into account in calculating public deficits is also necessary. The Maastricht 
criteria refer to public debt, but the legacy from the past means that in general 
data for the CEECs refers to foreign debt. With regard to interest rates, the 
underdeveloped long-term capital markets in many of the CEECs mean that data 
on long-term bonds is generally not available for these countries. Table 1 (in the 
Appendix) therefore sets out both long-term bond yields for some of the present 
EU members, and the Central Bank discount rate and lending rates for these 
countries1 2 and some of the CEECs to illustrate that interest rates are generally 
higher in the latter.
Inflation is proving extremely resilient in the CEECs, and, as shown in Tables 
1 and 2 of Appendix 1, most CEECs fail to meet the criteria on inflation and 
interest rates13. As emerges from Tables 2-5 of Appendix 1, and allowing for 
difficulties of comparison, most CEECs meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria, but 
some seem unlikely to meet the exchange rate criterion.
11 A further difficulty could arise from the high share of budgetary redistribution in GDP. 
According to Palankai (1996) this amounted to 60%  for Hungary in 1993, compared with 40- 
45% in Western Europe, and 46% for the Czech Republic.
12 The discount rate is defined as the rate at which monetary institutes lend or discount 
eligible paper for deposit money banks. The lending rate is used to meet the short-run and 
medium-run financing needs of the private sector.
13 Economic transformation may contribute to inflationary pressures through price 
liberalisation, the ending of the CMEA trading system (and the consequent increase in energy 
prices), devaluation and increased public spending on infrastructure and unemployment 
benefits, wage indexation, and, in some countries, servicing of the public debt. As a result 
there may be increased inflationary expectations and these could prove self-fulfilling. The high 




























































































In order to assess the microeconomic "readiness"14 of the CEECs to join the 
EU, it is useful to consider Table 6 in Appendix 1, which was produced by the 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The Table brings 
together and summarises the main indicators of progress in restructuring, 
privatisation and systemic change. Further indicators could be added to this list, 
such as the rates of growth and of investment, and the ability to reduce 
unemployment, which are shown in Table 4. In most CEECs there is still a need 
for further progress with regard to restructuring of the banking and insurance 
systems and large-scale industry as well as the implementation of additional 
measures with regard to social security.15
The capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Community
With regard to capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the Community, the risk is that with removal of the barriers many firms 
in the CEECs whose output was destined for the domestic or former CMEA16 
markets would be unable to survive in an enlarged EU market. Against this it 
can be argued that the CEECs have an advantage as a result of lower wages, but 
in many cases this is offset by the structural shortcomings of industries.17
Although productivity has been increasing in most of the CEECs in recent years, 
there has been considerable pressure for wage increases, fuelled by the need to 
raise low living standards. In some cases (and notably the Czech Republic in 
early 1997), nominal currency stability has undermined the cushion which 
undervalued exchange rates provided during the early years of transition. One 
of the results of legislative approximation in the areas of social and 
environmental policy could be to raise production costs in the CEECs.
In deciding which economic sectors in which CEECs are ready to cope with 
competitive pressures and market forces in an enlarged Community, a detailed
14 The questions of macroeconomic performance and microeconomic transition are 
intrinsically linked, so what is entailed here is a shift of emphasis.
15 For an extensive discussion of these issues, see Agenda 2000.
16 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance or Comecon.
17 For instance, as the EC Commission’s Agricultural Strategy Paper (1995), p. 7, argues, 
despite lower labour costs, inefficiencies in food processing and distribution mean that a 
doubling or more of wheat prices between the farm gate and the border is not exceptional in 




























































































analysis of their economies is necessary and should take into account progress 
in the following areas:
• the creation of a stable and competitive economic environment, inter alia 
through the privatisation process and the introduction of an adequate legal 
framework with regard to property rights, contracts, competition and 
company law
• the evolution of the banking and financial sectors
• the development of a modem, efficient administrative system and a role 
of the state appropriate to a market-oriented economy18
• restructuring and modernisation of industries in decline such as coal, steel, 
agriculture and shipbuilding
• widening of the industrial base and the development of small and medium 
enterprises
• success in developing industries characterised by growing demand and 
high technology which are at the core of an information society19 
demonopolisation and/or the development of a suitable regulatory 
framework for sectors dominated by former state-owned enterprises, such 
as energy and telecommunications
• the introduction of measures to encourage R&D and technological 
innovation
• measures to promote foreign investment
Governments in the CEECs are under considerable pressure from producer 
interests to introduce protectionist measures, and other forms of assistance to 
enterprises20, so care should be taken to resist lobbying activities. This is a 
further reason for the importance of coordinating industrial policy with
18 This involves a reduction in state ownership and the use of direct controls, but it should 
not be taken to imply that transition can be achieved simply by the withdrawal of the state: 
This misconception led to the problem of "desertification" in many of the CEECs during the 
early 1990s.
19 However, newly established domestic private firms are in a weak position as they have 
to cope with the "infant industry syndrome" (Palankai 1996, p. 247) which involves building 
new capacities, looking for new markets, consolidating management techniques and so on. 
Foreign direct investment, strategic alliances with Western firms and joint ventures can play 
a key role in this process.
20 The Hungarian economist, Komai (1980, 1986) has described the network which linked 
"the paternalistic state and the firm which is its client" in the central-planning system, and it 





























































































competition policy and trade measures.21 Trade liberalisation is required by the 
obligations of the Europe Agreements and Uruguay Round, but the CEECs have 
a certain amount of leeway in interpreting these obligations.22 On numerous 
occasions the CEECs have used the various protective clauses allowed for in the 
Europe Agreements23, even though protectionism is unlikely to prove an 
efficient instrument in promoting improvements in competitiveness. The degree 
of unrestricted trade an applicant country has achieved with the Union before 
enlargement will be an important element to be considered.
One of the main arguments advanced in favour of the EFTA countries forming 
the European Economic Area (EEA) or joining the EU itself was the loss in 
relative competitiveness that their firms would experience if they were left out 
of the Single Market. In the case of the CEECs the question of expected benefits 
from participating in the Single Market is rendered more complex, as account 
also has to be taken of their capacity to cope with competitive pressures. None 
the less, some members of the Working Group argued that CEECs participating 
in the internal market were likely to benefit from an additional stimulus to 
competition and technical progress, and from the greater scope for exploiting 
economies of scale.24 Insofar as enlargement succeeds in creating a more 
dynamic economic environment, some of the adjustment costs might be eased.
Though the Copenhagen criteria refer to the ability of the CEECs to withstand 
competitive pressures in an enlarged EU, the question also arises for the existing 
EU(15) member states. The sensitive sectors, such as agriculture, textiles, 
clothing, coal, footwear, and steel, play an important role in the weaker regions 
and member states such as Greece and Portugal. With the removal of barriers 
there is a risk that some of the weaker EU regions and sectors would no longer
21 Zielinska-Glebocka (1996).
22 See the section on trade below.
23 For instance, Poland used general safeguards for balance of payments purposes in 1993 
and 1996, and for motor vehicles in 1994. In 1994 tariffs were imposed on 
telecommunications on the basis of the infant industry argument, and in 1996 protective 
measures were imposed on petrochemical imports on the basis of the restructuring clause 
(Zielinska-Glebocka, 1996).




























































































be able to compete with low-cost production in the CEECs, so would experience 
higher rates of unemployment and closures.25
Various arrangements have emerged to meet this fear. For instance, outward 
processing trade has been used widely in the clothing and textiles and this 
largely accounts for the rapid increase in the CEEC share of extra-EU imports 
of these products.26 The share of CEEC exports in extra-EU imports of motor 
vehicles also rose27, partly as a result of the role played by Western 
subcontracting and investments.
Acceptance of the acquis communautaire concerning the Single Market
The Working Group also considered it likely that the speed and progress of the 
accession negotiations will depend on success in the programme for regulatory 
alignment with the Single Market set out in the Commission’s 1995 White 
Paper, Preparation o f the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
for Integration into the Internal Market o f the Union.2* Integration of the 
CEECs into the Single Market entails the elimination of physical, technical, 
fiscal and tariff barriers between participating states.29 For that purpose the
25 Cadot and de Melo (1995) have used estimates of a gravity model, and extrapolations 
of observed structural developments to analyse whether increased imports from the CEECs 
is likely to result in job destruction in the EU. Their simulations suggest an upper limit of 
some 13,000 jobs being lost in the EU, with very little regional concentration (apart from 
some 850 jobs being lost in coal production in Lorraine).
26 The CEEC(6) share of extra-EU imports of these products grew from 7% for each 
group in 1989, to 13% and 14% respectively in 1994 (UN/ECE, Economic Survey o f Europe 
1995-1996).
27 The share of CEEC(6) exports in extra-EU imports of motor vehicles also rose to 5.3% 
in 1994 (UN/ECE, Economic Survey o f  Europe 1995-1996).
28 The Single Market is defined as an area without internal frontiers in which the four 
freedoms (of movement of goods, services, people and capital) are ensured.
29 One way of eliminating the barriers to movement of goods and services would be to 
introduce common rules and regulations. However, the detailed, technical legislation that this 
involved was likely to prove too complex and costly, as well as running the risks of excessive 
uniformity and bureaucratic interference. To meet this difficulty the Community relies so far 
as possible on the principle of mutual recognition (established in the famous Cassis de Dijon 
case of 1978), according to which all goods lawfully manufactured and marketed in one 
member country should be accepted also in other member countries. Exceptions related to 





























































































CEECs will have to put into place "legislation and regulatory systems, standards 
and certification methods compatible with those of the European Union".30
Though the list is not meant to be exhaustive, the regulatory alignment of the 
CEECs to the internal market requires measures and investment in the fields of: 
health, safety and consumer protection; environmental protection; services, 
including transport, energy, telecommunications and financial services; customs 
and indirect taxation; competition policy and social policy. This is a far greater 
challenge than in earlier enlargements because Community legislation has 
expanded considerably and the task of adopting the acquis was easier for the 
economically-developed applicants that had participated in the European 
Economic Area.
With regard to social policy the aim is to ensure in the end the operation of a 
"level playing field". However, some members of the group argued that social 
and environmental policy areas should probably not be entirely harmonised prior 
to accession.31 To do so is to require the CEECs to accept tighter obligations 
than existing member states, as many derogations have been granted for 
environmental regulations, and the UK had opted out of the Social Chapter. As 
some members of the Working Group pointed out, there is also a tension 
between requiring the CEECs to accept the acquis on the Single Market and 
introducing a long transition period before freedom of labour movement.
Ability to take on the acquis will also be measured according to whether the 
applicant country has met its obligations under the Europe Agreement. The 
Europe Agreements also committed the CEECs to adopting competition policies 
compatible with those of the Community and this objective was further specified 
in the 1995 White Paper.32 In this context external pressure to force measures 
which are unpopular, but essential to the transformation process, may play an 
important role. The introduction of effective anti-trust measures is urgently 
required in the CEECs, where the legacy of central planning has left a
The introduction of the Single Market also has to respect the principle of subsidiarity whereby 
legislation at the Community level should only be introduced where the same or a better effect 
cannot be achieved at a regional or national level.
30 Conclusions of the European Council at Essen, 9 and 10 December 1994, SN 300/94, 
p. 13.
31 See Smith et al. (1996) for a discussion of this issue.
32 The White Paper makes reference to Articles 85, 86 and 90 relating to competition 




























































































concentrated structure of production, and often privatisation of state enterprises 
has not been accompanied by adequate measures of demonopolisation. The need 
to bring legislation in line with that in EU countries in areas such as the control 
of state aids can provide CEEC governments with a strong justification for 
resisting the pressure of producer groups.
However, the proposals presented in the 1995 White Paper are sometimes 
difficult to respect in the conditions of transitional economies. For instance, the 
EU rules on restrictions on vertical restraints may prove excessively binding in 
countries attempting to set up adequate distribution networks. Similarly, the 
exigencies of privatisation and restructuring may require a flexible approach to 
controls on state aids during a certain transition period, still to be determined.33
A full assessment of the degree of regulatory alignment of the CEECs would 
require a detailed analysis of the state of legislation in each of the CEECs and 
is beyond the present scope. An important consideration will be the ability of the 
public administrations to implement and to monitor compliance with Community 
legislation, in particular in areas such as finance and external borders. As it is 
clear that some flexibility has to be granted in the form of temporary derogations 
during varying transition periods, it is also clear that the legislatory acquis of the 
Single Market has to be adopted in its entirety at the end of these periods.
III. Implications of Enlargement in Stages
The implications of enlargement in stages for the EU’s institutions
Enlargement will have far-reaching implications for the EU’s institutions and 
decision-making processes.34 Reforms will need to be undertaken to ensure that 
enlargement does not lead to slower or blocked decision-making, and unwieldy 
institutions. The Amsterdam European Council wanted to reform the voting 
procedures and particularly extend majority voting in all three pillars, reassess 
the weighting of the votes in the Council in order to better take into account the 
relative weights of small and large member states (given that the next 
enlargement will include a large number of small or medium-sized states) and 
streamline the institutions.
33Smith et al. (1996).
34 The institutional implications have been discussed in EC Commission (1992), pp 14-16, 




























































































Only very limited results were achieved. Qualified majority voting has been 
extended to a few more areas within the first pillar; in these areas the co­
decision procedure (allowing the European Parliament a veto power) has also 
been extended. The intention is to reduce the number of Commissioners from 
large member states to one upon the first stage of enlargement (if it includes five 
or less member states), provided that by that date, the weighting of the votes in 
the Council has been modified (see Protocol on the institutions with the prospect 
of enlargement of the European Union, article 1). No final agreement has yet 
been achieved regarding this question. In the two "intergovernmental" pillars, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs, no 
breakthrough towards majority voting was possible. Unanimity remains the rule; 
majority voting is only possible in very limited cases. Amsterdam has so far 
failed to prepare the Union for the enlargement process. Further steps are 
necessary even before the first enlargement takes place to agree on a modified 
weighting of the votes in the Council; the Amsterdam European Council 
concluded that a new revision of the institutional arrangements will be necessary 
before the membership of the Union exceeds twenty member states.
The implications of enlargement in stages for the structural funds
While the economic criteria provide an indication of the speed at which the 
CEECs are catching up with existing EU members, as Table 7 shows, with the 
exception of Slovenia, the GDP per capita in the CEECs remains far below that 
of the poorest EU members.35 Despite the rapid growth of the CEECs, it 
appears likely that it will take many years to eliminate the income disparity 
compared with existing EU member states.36
According to Courchene et al. (1993)37, the financial perspective for the 1994-
35 When comparing per capita income in the CEECs and EU it is essential to bear in mind 
the limitations of comparisons of this type. All the CEECs have rapidly growing private 
sectors, much of which fails to show up in official statistics, though it must be recalled that 
most EU economies also have substantial "informal" sectors. A second difficulty arises in that 
the prices of non-traded relative to traded goods tend to be lower in poorer countries. For this 
reason comparisons of per capita income are often made on the basis of purchasing power 
parity (PPP). However, as Table 7 illustrates, even using this measure, per capita income in 
the CEECs is much lower than in the existing EU.
36 Baldwin (1994) estimates that even with 5% growth, the catch-up period ranges from 
8 years for Slovenia, to 22 years for Poland and 26 years for Slovakia.
37 Other estimates, such as those of Brenton and Gros (1993) and Fayolle and Le Cacheux 




























































































99 period agreed at the Edinburgh summit entailed a commitment of per capita 
support to the two poorest countries (Greece and Portugal) of 400 ECU per 
capita in 1999. Given the "relative backwardness and evident lack of modem 
infrastructure"38 of the CEECs, a transfer of 400 ECU per capita would seem 
a minimum claim. However, if applied to the four Visegrad countries, it would 
imply an increase in structural spending of 26 billion ECU, while the additional 
inclusion of the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania would raise the structural 
funds by 54 billion ECU per year. This is a huge sum when compared with the 
overall EU budget of 59 billion ECU for 1994. The transfers to the CEECs 
through the structural and cohesion funds proposed in Agenda 2000 are 
somewhat lower, but none the less substantial. The Commission proposed 
allocating 1 billion ECU to the CEECs each year over the 2000-2006 period as 
part of the pre-accession strategy, as well as 38 billion ECU from the structural 
and cohesion funds for the new member states. As a result, by 2006, the 
structural transfers for enlargement would account for about 30% of all transfers 
through the structural funds.39
A further difficulty in extending structural measures to the CEECs arises from 
the principle of additionality which aims at ensuring that Community funds do 
not simply replace national expenditure, and requires that Community measures 
are accompanied by matching funding from the member states of up to 50%. 
The estimated transfers from extending the structural funds on present criteria 
to the CEECs would represent an extremely high percentage of the GDP of these 
countries.40 A ceiling, possibly in the order of 4% of GDP, is therefore likely 
to be placed on the size of the transfer to CEECs joining the EU. This would 
also help to take into account their absorption capacity. In parallel, a further 
geographical and thematical concentration of financial means in the present 
Union will be necessary, without giving up solidarity with the poorest regions 
of the Union. It is obvious that countries in the first wave of enlargement will 
have a definite advantage over countries left out, as they benefit fully from 
integration in the structural funds.
criteria.
38 Courchene et al. (1993), p. 114.
39 Agenda 2000, volume I, p. 88.
40 According to a study carried out by the Commission (1996b), these transfers would 
amount to 15% of GDP for Hungary, 18% for the Czech and Slovak Republics, 25% for 




























































































As shown in Table 8 even the countries which appear to head the accession list 
would make a sizeable addition to the level of agricultural production and labour 
force in an enlarged EU. According to the estimates presented in Agenda 2000, 
the costs of extending the present CAP to all ten CEECs would be in the order 
of 11 billion ECU per year by 2005 of which direct payments would account for 
about 7 billion ECU, market support measures (in particular for the dairy sector) 
would amount to 2.5 billion ECU, and accompanying measures would absorb 
a further 1.5 billion ECU.41 Earlier studies generally suggested far higher costs 
of extending the CAP to the CEECs, with for example, Anderson and Tyres 
(1993) estimating a cost of 40.5 billion ECU for the Visegrad 4.42
It is difficult to make predictions concerning the impact of extending the CAP 
to CEECs joining the EU, partly because the CAP itself is under pressure for 
reform, and partly because after accession agriculture will probably be subject 
to a long transition period.
It has been assumed here that when the CAP is extended to the first wave of 
CEECs joining the EU, it will have been reformed further, with increased use 
of direct income payments and prices closer (but not completely) in line with 
world levels.43 The question of how, and to what extent, farmers in the CEECs 
joining the EU will benefit from direct income payments remains open, but at 
least some extension of these payments to CEECs joining the EU seems likely, 
even though direct income payments in the EU have been introduced to
The implications of enlargement in stages for the CAP
41 Agenda 2000, Volume II, p. 31.
42 A large share of the difference in estimates is the result of different forecasts 
concerning future levels of production and consumption in the CEECs, and the extent to 
which the effects of the MacSharry Reform and the Uruguay Round Agreement are taken into 
account.
43 Agenda 2000 proposed a radical reform along these lines with a reduction of the 
intervention price for cereals from 119.19 ECU/t to 93.35 ECU/t and reductions in market 
support prices of dairy products by 10% and of beef from 2780 ECU/t to 1950 ECU/t. 
Farmers in the EU (15) would be compensated for these price cuts through direct payments. 
Milk quotas would continue until 2006 and compulsory set-aside would be abolished
With these reforms, the Commission proposed that expenditure from the EU budget 
for CEEC agriculture would amount to 17.8 billion ECU over the 2000-2006 period. This 
would consist of 0.5 billion ECU (rising to 0.6 billion ECU from 2002) in pre-accession aid, 
while new member states would receive a total of 6.2 billion ECU for market organisation 
measures and 7.6 billion for rural development accompanying measures over the 2002-2006 




























































































compensate price reductions. These price reductions will not occur in the 
acceding countries. On the contrary, fanners in these countries will benefit from 
higher price levels, improved access to EU markets, and what remains of the EU 
system of export subsidies (though this is subject to GATT/WTO obligations 
being met). Farmers in CEECs joining the EU will therefore be placed at a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis their counterparts in CEECs (temporarily) left 
out, not only on EU markets, but also in third countries, and the CEECs 
themselves.
The impact of enlargement in stages on trade
As a result of the provisions of the Europe Agreements, a free trade area in 
manufactured products (and to some extent services) will be in place before 
enlargement, including both the CEECs which join, and those which do not. The 
Europe Agreements permit the continued use of "contingent protection", or anti­
dumping and safeguard measures44 in EU-CEEC trade, but during the first 
years of operation of the Europe Agreements the use of these instruments was 
very limited.45 However, it seems likely that the impact on potential trade, or
44 A safeguard clause in the agreements (Article 24) permits "appropriate measures" to be 
introduced when a product is being imported in such increased quantities as to cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers or serious deterioration in the economic 
situation of a region. In addition there are provisions permitting the introduction of safeguard 
measures in specific sectors, such as agriculture (Article 15).
Although there is a standstill provision in the agreements (no new customs duties or 
quantitative restrictions can be introduced once the agreement enters into operation), the 
CEECs may introduce "exceptional measures" in the form of reintroducing or increasing 
tariffs in situations where there are "infant industries or certain sectors undergoing 
restructuring or facing serious difficulties" (Article 22). Given the transformation process, 
most industries in the CEECs fall in to these categories, so the CEECs virtually have a blank 
cheque to re-introduce restrictions.
45 As Costello and Toledano Laredo (1994) illustrate, anti-dumping cases initiated against 
the CEECs fell from over 20 per year in the mid-1980s to only 2 cases each in 1992 and 
1993. Because EU anti-dumping measures remain in force for 5 years, the CEECs have 
inherited a number of such measures from their state-trading past. At the end of 1993, 19 such 
measures remained in force against the CEECs with Poland (6) followed by Romania (5) 
facing the highest number of anti-dumping actions. In total, only 60 million ECU or 0.32% 
of EU imports were affected by anti-dumping measures in 1992. The highest share was for 
Bulgaria (1.24% of all exports to the EC) followed by Romania (0.7%). At least in the early 
years of operation of the agreements, safeguard measures were rarely used. In 1992, only two 
safeguard actions were taken: on Community iron and steel imports from Czechoslovakia, and 





























































































trade which would take place in the absence of such measures is significant. The 
threat posed by the mere existence of anti-dumping mechanisms or safeguards 
is likely to have implications for the level of trade.
Full integration into the Single Market and acceptance of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) have to wait until accession (possibly with the 
application of a transition period). Enlargement in waves therefore means that 
different groups of CEECs are likely to move from a free trade area to a 
customs union (by adopting the CCP) and Single Market at different speeds.46
A major difference between a free trade area and a customs union is that the 
former requires rules of origin. These may be complex to administer and, the 
regulatory uncertainty to which they give rise means that market access is 
conditional (Smith et al. 1996). The CEECs joining the EU (and acceding to the 
CCP and the Single Market) before others will be at an advantage with regard 
to rules of origin and contingent protection. As a result there could be some 
trade diversion between CEECs joining the EU and those left out.47
The impact of enlargement in stages on FDI
Foreign direct investment (FDI) may contribute to transfers of technology, 
management techniques and marketing skills, and plays a central role in 
restructuring in the CEECs where domestic capital is scarce. According to World 
Bank estimates48, FDI inflows to the CEECs and former Soviet Republics 
nearly doubled in 1995, reaching 5% of world inflows compared with only 1% 
in 1991. Inflows of FDI to the CEECs have been heavily concentrated in the 
three of the countries at the head of the accession list: Hungary, Poland and the
46 A free trade area entails the member states removing all barriers on trade between 
themselves, though they retain the freedom to implement different commercial policies 
towards third countries. In a customs union the member states remove all barriers on trade 
between themselves and introduce a common external commercial policy (for instance a 
common external tariff). A single market is a customs unions which also entails free mobility 
of factors of production.
47 This risk could be particularly great as (with the exception of the Baltic states) CEEC 
exports to the EU tend to be relatively similar. Petroleum and petroleum products, and other 
raw materials are an important component of the exports of the Baltic states to the EU, and 
these are generally characterised by a low level of protection in international trade. In contrast, 
the exports from the other CEECs tend to be concentrated in the sensitive sectors, which are 
the sectors most subject to protectionist measures on world markets




























































































Czech Republic. The EU accounts for about three quarters of the FDI stock in 
Hungary and Bulgaria, two-thirds in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia and just over 50% of the FDI stock in the Baltic States49.
The motives for FDI in the CEECs include the chance to expand into new 
eastern markets, the opportunities offered by privatisation, and the possibility 
of exploiting low production costs. Foreign investors are attracted by the 
relatively cheap, well-educated labour supply and the nearness of some CEECs 
to major West European markets. However, the overall economic outlook, the 
institutional structure and the degree of economic and political stability also play 
a role in FDI decisions. Economic recovery was one of the factors contributing 
to the rapid increase in FDI since 1995.
Participation in the programme of regulatory alignment set out in the 1995 
White Paper, and an announcement by the EU that accession of a particular 
CEEC was acceptable can therefore play an important role in influencing FDI 
decisions in the CEECs. The White Paper sets out the steps necessary for 
progressive adoption of the internal market legislation on issues such as 
intellectual property, company law, financial services, competition law etc. In 
this way it provides a guideline of how to create an institutional framework 
capable of protecting the interests of foreign investors. The announcement that 
a CEEC is ready to join the EU is likely to be interpreted as a sign of its 
progress in transition, and may have a positive effect on expectations concerning 
the future economic performance of that country. The prospect of EU 
membership may be seen as a guarantee of economic and political stability, and 
so reassure foreign investors.
It therefore seems probable that enlargement in stages could lead to a redirection 
of FDI flows towards CEECs joining the EU at the expense of those left out. 
The tendency of FDI to concentrate in CEECs marked out to join the EU early 
is likely to be reinforced by the high share of FDI flows coming from the EU 
and the fact most FDI is already attracted by three of the countries at the top of 
the accession list.50
49 The World Bank, 1996.
50 The new economic geography literature (Krugman and Venables 1990; Krugman 1991) 
suggests that there may be a risk of enlargement in stages leading to a divided pattern of 
development, with the economic performance of the CEECs (temporarily) left out of the EU 
lagging behind, if not deteriorating in absolute terms. According to this approach, factors such 
as nearness to a large market provide a strong incentive for other firms to locate in that area. 




























































































Against this it might be argued that CEECs remaining outside the EU might be 
at an advantage in attracting FDI because of the opportunities to exploit social 
and/or environmental advantages. Producers within the EU might set up joint 
ventures or other forms of industrial cooperation with CEEC firms in order to 
take advantage of such "offshore" conditions. However, the 1995 White Paper 
specifically calls for regulatory alignment in the field of environmental and 
social policies, so, insofar as legislative approximation proceeds, there should be 
less scope for this type of "offshore" activity in CEECs outside the EU.
The evidence suggests that the announcement of the 1992 Single Market 
Programme caused a large increase in FDI in Spain and Portugal, and, at least 
initially, a fall in net FDI in the EFTA countries.51 Negotiations for EU 
membership of Spain and Portugal began in 1980, and were concluded in 1986. 
Both countries expected to participate in the Single Market Programme and 
experienced above average FDI inflows in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most 
EFTA countries suffered a decline in their FDI in the late 1980s, but, with the 
exception of Switzerland, this was halted, possibly as a result of policies being 
announced to ensure their participation in the 1992 Programme.52
As was pointed out during the Working Group discussion, the way in which the 
Single Market Programme was presented initially in the 1985 Cockfield White 
Paper and Single European Act represented a major marketing success. The 
timetable set out deadlines which fixed precise targets, and focused the attention 
of politicians and businessmen. At least in the late 1980s the predictions of an
more chance of attracting industry, and FDI In particular, CEECs sharing common borders 
with the EU(15) may be at an advantage in attracting economic activity, as there will be 
opportunities for transfrontier cooperation in the form of joint ventures, subcontracting, local 
and regional policy coordination and the expansion of transport and telecommunications 
infrastructure
The new economic geography approach attaches importance to the fact that the 
location decisions of firms are very expensive to reverse, so expectations play a crucial role. 
In deciding where to locate, future policy (or uncertainty about future policy) may be as 
important as current policy. In a world where various outcomes are possible, the credibility 
of government policy can play a crucial role. The announcement that a CEEC is to join the 
EU may be taken as indication of its progress in transition, and as a guarantee of future 
stability, so may have large and lasting effects on the location of industry.
51 For a more complete discussion of this issue see Baldwin et al. (1996).
52 In 1989 Jacques Delors proposed the creation of the European Economic Area and its 
implementation began from January 1994, but by then Austria, Sweden and Finland had opted 
for full EU membership and joined in January 1995. Switzerland rejected joining the EEA in 




























































































improved economic climate with scope for restructuring of EU industry appeared 
to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Would it be possible to repeat this earlier 
success with the announcement of a clearly-defined, precise strategy for 
enlargement? The style of the 1995 White Paper suggests that it was an 
attempted step in this direction, but to acquire greater credibility, some of the 
uncertainties surrounding enlargement would have to be removed.
Migratory pressures
One of the fears of existing EU member states is that the introduction of 
freedom of movement of labour for CEECs joining the EU will lead to large- 
scale migratory pressures towards the West. However, most of the literature on 
the topic suggests that if ethnic upheaval and severe civil strife are avoided, 
migratory pressures will probably be on a manageable scale (possibly 3-5% of 
the populations of the CEECs).53 The conditions for accession set out at the 
Copenhagen Summit aim at ensuring that this kind of political and economic 
collapse is avoided in prospective EU members.
However, predictions concerning migration are notoriously difficult to make, as 
a sudden worsening (or improvement) in economic conditions may alter the 
pressure to migrate substantially. If a hard core of EU members decided to move 
forward on a faster integration track, pressures to migrate could increase. As a 
result the view that migration within an enlarged EU is likely to be on a 
contained scale was not shared by all members of the Working Group.
A long transition period before introducing freedom of labour movement after 
accession would help to assuage Western fears concerning migratory pressures. 
However, any freedom of movement will first benefit those countries entering 
with the first enlargement.
The implications of enlargement in stages for security and foreign policy
Enlargement in stages will have implications for the EU’s foreign relations and 
for European security in general. Enlargement has been agreed in particular 
because it should help spread stability and security eastwards, by consolidating 
democracy and the transition to a market economy. However, it could be 
perceived by outsiders as part of a process of re-creating a divided Europe, and 
might then contribute to a worsening of relations with the rest of Europe. Given 
the suspicion and even antagonism in relations between the CEECs and Russia,




























































































the newly admitted CEECs might push for a tougher EU stance against Russia. 
The EU’s relations with other countries in the region could also be strained 
where the CEECs have had difficult relations (e.g. Bulgaria-Macedonia and 
Romania-Moldova).
Enlargement in stages will certainly affect relations between the expanded Union 
and those applicant states that have initially been excluded. The excluded CEECs 
could perceive that EU accession is too distant a prospect, and might even be 
destabilised by the process. Applying conditionality strictly may not enhance 
stability. Furthermore, the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe 
will be able to influence aid and trade decisions with respect to the other 
CEECs, the political dialogue with them, and eventual decisions on future waves 
of enlargement, possibly to the perceived detriment of the outsiders. This is 
potentially a greater problem where relations between the CEECs have already 
been tense (such as between Hungary and Romania, and Hungary and Slovakia). 
For these reasons, the relations among the CEECs should be taken into 
consideration in decisions on enlargement. The enlargement process should be 
used to find solutions to existing or potential conflicts. After all, the prospect of 
accession gives the Union a powerful political lever.
In addition, in July 1997, NATO decided on which countries it will embrace in 
a first stage of enlargement, and the process of NATO enlargement will occur 
before the first stage of an EU eastern enlargement. The three successful 
candidates for NATO accession are the same "top" candidates for EU accession, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but if both EU and NATO enlarge 
exclusively to these three countries in the first stage, the division of Europe 
could appear to outsiders to be an armed one as well. To avoid the potential 
negative effects of this for stability, some NATO members unsuccessfully 
proposed including Romania and Slovenia in the first round of enlargement. The 
Commission has recommended opening EU membership negotiations with 
Estonia and Slovenia. While inclusion in both organisations would presumably 
be the most stabilising for the countries concerned, accession to one or the other 
could also have a stabilising effect, whereas exclusion from both might not.
Only countries which are members of both NATO and the EU may become full 
members of the WEU. Differing membership in the EU, WEU, and NATO will 
continue, with the consequent difficulties for coordinating the security activities 
of these organisations. This could affect eventual decisions on an EU-WEU 
merger, as envisaged in the Amsterdam Treaty.
Building further ties between the Union and the CEECs excluded from the first 




























































































Union and thus help overcome the potentially destabilising implications of 
enlargement in stages. The Working Group’s proposals for a "reassurance 
framework" are discussed in the next section.
IV. A Pre-accession Framework of Reassurance
Given the decision to proceed with enlargement in stages, one of the highest 
priorities should be to ensure that the consequence is not a differentiated pattern 
of development in Europe, with the CEECs left out of the first wave(s) of 
enlargement lagging increasingly behind. The Working Group agreed that the 
effects of opening negotiations with only a few CEECs must be countered by 
building a "reassurance framework" for those CEECs that are excluded from the 
first stage of enlargement. The objective of such a reinforced pre-accession 
strategy would be to minimise the possible drawbacks of being left out of the 
first stage of enlargement and to reassure the excluded CEECs that they are still 
in the queue for membership. What is necessary is a broad-based package which 
encompasses both the CEECs entering the EU in the first wave and those left 
out. In this process, signals will be very important, both in creating positive 
expectations, and in rendering the process of enlargement in stages more 
palatable to public opinion in CEECs left out of the first wave of enlargement. 
The governments of excluded CEECs should not have to return home empty- 
handed. In Agenda 2000, the Commission suggested a single framework 
(Accession Partnership) bringing together all the resources and forms of 
assistance available for preparing each candidate country for membership. This 
framework will include a multi-annual programme for adopting the acquis 
according to an indicative timetable.54
For this purpose, the members of the Working Group suggested that the 



































































































As can be seen from Tables 9-11, at present there is a large gap between 
transfers to the existing EU member states arising from the Common 
Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds, and transfers to the CEECs through 
the PHARE Programme. According to the 1994-99 financial perspective, in 
1997 about 26.5 billion ECU was allocated to the Structural and Cohesion Funds 
from the Community Budget, while roughly a further 37 billion was allocated 
expenditure on the CAP. In contrast the total EC budget allocation for spending 
on PHARE amounted to only 11 billion ECU for the ten years 1989-99. This 
estimate excludes grants and loans from the EU member states. If these are 
included the figure for assistance from the EU rises to 46 billion ECU over the 
1990-95 period.
It is essential to avoid such a wide discrepancy between transfers arising from 
Community policies for CEECs joining the EU, and the far smaller amount of 
PFIARE funds available for CEECs remaining outside the first wave(s) of 
enlargement. In part such a difference in treatment will be avoided by the 
transitional periods which seem likely before the CEECs joining the EU can 
participate fully in the CAP and structural measures. However, it is also 
necessary to introduce an intermediate programme between PHARE and EC 
policies which involves participation of all CEECs in cost-intensive Community 
policies prior to accession. In this way all CEECs (including those not in the 
first wave of enlargement) could benefit from additional transfers for structural 
measures, R&D and agricultural restructuring.
This strengthened and transformed Programme could take the form of an 
"Accession Partnership" which would complement the Europe Agreements and 
which would set out a framework of clear, accession-related objectives. In 
particular, priority could be given to institution building and support for 
investment, both to improve infrastructure and to modernise the economy. The 
measures would be individually tailored to the needs of the CEEC in question. 
The aim would also be to get away from an approach based on technical 
assistance, and render the beneficiary country directly responsible for the 
implementation of measures. In this way the CEECs would also gain experience 
of working with Community policies prior to accession.
The Edinburgh summit fixed the ceiling on contributions of the EU member 
states to the EC budget at 1.27% of their GDP. It appears unlikely that there 
will be the political agreement necessary to increase that ceiling in the next 
financial perspective which is due to begin after 1999. Part of the ceiling from 




























































































spending under the next financial perspective. This suggests that structural 
spending after 1999 could be in the order of 0.46% of the GDP of the EU. Even 
with such measures, some reallocation of structural funds away from the present 
major beneficiaries appears inevitable with enlargement, and is likely to 
encounter the resistance of the poorer countries of the EU(15). Subsequently it 
appears likely that the CEECs joining the EU in the first stage will also have to 
share in the financial solidarity necessary to ensure adequate transfers to CEECs 
left out of the first wave of enlargement.55
As shown in Tables 9 and 10, the International Financial Institutions play an 
important role in contributing to the financing of the Economic Restructuring 
Programme in Central and Eastern Europe. The EC Budget would provide the 
basis for financing the revised pre-accession programme, but this should be 
supplemented by financial assistance from the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the World 
Bank, together with continuing support for macroeconomic stabilisation from the 
IMF and DGII of the EC Commission. It is necessary to ensure that these 
organisations continue to play an active role, even after the accession of some 
CEECs to the EU56, and to organise an appropriate mix of grants and loans.
Trade measures
As shown in Tables 12-14, since 1989 there has been a dramatic increase in 
trade between the EU and CEECs. 57 With the exception of agriculture, the 
Europe Agreements set in place a free trade area, and in practice there still 
remains much scope for the CEECs to make use of the concessions which this 
entails. The CEECs should take care in exploiting the leeway offered by the 
Europe Agreements for them to introduce protective measures as this could run 
counter to their long-term interest in industrial restructuring and modernisation.
55 Agenda 2000 suggests a doubling of the present 1.5 billion ECU in PHARE money per 
year, by adding 1.5 billion ECU in structural expenditure, in particular in the fields of 
transport and environment, and 0.5 billion ECU for modernising agriculture. The total amount 
allocated would remain the same, meaning that those CEECs that do not join the EU in the 
first phase will receive a higher allocation after the first stage of enlargement.
56 In particular, it is necessary to ensure that the World Bank continues to lend to CEECs 
even after they have joined the EU.





























































































The Community has made it clear that it will not remove contingent protection 
until the CEECs have made substantial progress in applying the acquis 
communautaire with regard to competition policy and state aids.58 However, 
the process of legislative approximation to the Single Market remains slow.
The CEECs remaining outside the first wave of enlargement would remain at a 
disadvantage in trade matters vis a vis those joining as a result of the operation 
of rules of origin. A proposed method for overcoming this disadvantage would 
be to introduce a customs union for all CEECs prior to joining the EU. In the 
case of Turkey a customs union was created with the Community as an 
intermediate step and a substitute for early accession.
The creation of a customs union between the EU and the CEECs would, 
however, have certain disadvantages at this stage. Adoption of the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) is indeed already part of the acquis that the CEECs 
will have to accept on accession. However, the creation of a customs union 
would entail loss of autonomy for trade policy on the part of the CEECs, and 
the obligation to accept the CCP in all its complexity. Over time the Community 
has evolved a "hierarchy of trade preferences" involving trade concessions to 
developing and other countries, and the CEECs would be required to take on the 
obligations this requires towards third countries. Moreover, with the exception 
of tariffs applied by the Baltic States on imports from Scandinavian countries, 
in most cases the tariffs applied by the CEECs are higher than the Common 
External Tariff of the Community. The additional strain on limited Community 
resources posed by negotiation of a customs union would distract from the more 
complex tasks of accession negotiations and evolving a broader-based pre­
accession strategy adequate to convince the CEECs left out of the first wave of 
enlargement that they remain in the integration process.
Agriculture
Extensive measures to assist the adjustment of CEEC agriculture prior to 
enlargement would also reduce the discriminatory effect of enlargement in stages 
on the agriculture of CEECs (temporarily) left out of the EU. Such measures 
would have to include further improvements in market access59, additional 
attempts to ensure that EU export subsidies do not lead to market disturbance
58 Smith et al. (1996).
59 These could include reduced tariffs, increased tariff quotas, and greater flexibility to 





























































































in the CEECs, and increased assistance for the structural adjustment of CEEC 
agriculture prior to accession. In the case of Portuguese accession, the 
Community financed a pre-accession programme of agricultural adjustment. If 
a similar programme were introduced for the CEECs60 it could help to 
overcome the particular difficulties faced by the food industry, and could also 
be used to further environmental objectives and overall programmes of rural 
development.
Investment
Under the PHARE Programme, financial assistance was given for investment in 
infrastructure in fields such as transport, telecommunications and energy. Aid 
was also given to investment to modernise the economy, through measures such 
as privatisation and restructuring, the introduction of less energy-intensive and 
more environmentally-friendly means of production, the development of 
financial services, help for small and medium enterprises and so on. The aim of 
the revised and reinforced pre-accession strategy should be to continue and 
increase Community and EFI support for such measures. The European 
Investment Bank could play a leading role in this context as the focus of the 
activities of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development appears to 
be shifting further eastwards.
The revised pre-accession strategy should also aim at creating a framework in 
which private foreign and domestic investment are encouraged. By stressing that 
the CEECs left out of the first wave(s) of enlargement remain part of the 
integration process, and by providing adequate institutional and financial backing 
to illustrate that this is the case, much could be done to avert the risk of 
investment diversion away from those countries.
Institutional provisions
The Working Group also discussed the potential institutional innovations that 
could be designed to link further the excluded CEECs and the EU, in addition 
to accession partnerships with the CEECs. One option is that of partial 
membership, or permitting the CEECs to join only some policy areas.61 For 
example, the CEECs could fully participate (e.g. enjoy the right to vote) in the 
second and third pillars, the CFSP and Justice/Home Affairs. This option was
60 For a more detailed discussion, see the "Agricultural Strategy Paper" and Agenda 2000, 
Volume I, p. 87.




























































































generally rejected by the Working Group, although it was noted that extending 
partial membership would have an important symbolic value. Allowing the 
CEECs to participate in only some policy areas would be entirely too 
complicated to implement in practice. Differing memberships of policy areas 
would be very hard to coordinate and ensure consistency: for example, the 
procedure for applying sanctions (first a unanimous common position in CFSP, 
then a decision taken in the Community framework) could be further 
complicated because of differing memberships in these frameworks. EU 
membership has always been understood as a balanced set of mutual rights and 
obligations governed by a single institutional framework, and should remain so. 
There would be the additional risk that partial membership could be perceived 
by the CEECs as "second-class membership", a substitute for full membership, 
or a way to delay further enlargement.
An additional way of including all the CEECs would be to offer full 
membership but to set long transition periods that are linked not to a time limit 
but to the fulfillment of certain conditions. Once a CEEC meets the criteria in 
a specific policy area, then it would become a full member, with voting rights 
and obligations. But such an approach would "import" unresolved transition 
problems into the EU, would be difficult to manage institutionally, and would 
put at risk policies and the single institutional framework of the Union.
Participation in EU programmes in, for example, research and development, 
education, internal market, and customs cooperation, should be extended. The 
CEECs could participate in expert group meetings in specific policy areas, to 
help familiarise the applicant countries with Community policies and procedures.
The "structured relationship", part of the pre-accession strategy, could certainly 
be strengthened. It is based on multilateral meetings between the EU and the 
CEECs, but frequently meetings have no defined objective or agenda, and are 
ill-prepared. Cooperation should have specific aims, and meetings should be 
prepared adequately, and in coordination with the CEECs. Specific aims could 
include preparation of the CEECs for membership and cooperative projects in 
areas such as environmental protection, transport, and so on.
Agenda 2000 maintains that the structured relationship will be overtaken by the 
strengthening of bilateral relations with each applicant country, through 
accession partnership. Instead of regular meetings, ad hoc multilateral meetings 
could be held when needed to deal with wider issues. To underline that 
enlargement is an ongoing process involving the whole of Europe, the European 
Conference would bring together heads of state or government, and possibly 




























































































Justice and Home Affairs. Consultations are particularly important to allow all 
participants to discuss neighbourhood problems in Europe and other problems 
of common concern like the fight against organised crime, illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking, and so on. The "sense of belonging" to the Union would be 
strengthened by collective European-wide cooperation.
The replacement of a multilateral approach with strengthened bilateral links, 
however, is not necessarily the best option. An increasing emphasis on 
bilateralism could give the impression that regional multilateral cooperation is 
less of a priority. As several Working Group members noted, building links 
among all European countries has been one of the EU’s objectives, and it is not 
clear that the differentiated bilateral approach to the applicant countries would 
contribute to this.
Conclusions
EU enlargement will take place in stages, as some CEECs will be ready 
to join before others. EU enlargement to the CEECs will help stabilise 
them, by consolidating their democracies and market economies, and 
integrating them into Western economic and security structures. 
Enlargement in stages could, however, have negative implications for 
those CEECs left out of the first stage. A broad-based new pre-accession 
strategy must be geared towards minimising these implications and thus 
ensuring that enlargement does spread stability and security eastwards.
The EU should not begin negotiations with all ten CEEC applicants at the 
same time, though this would signal the EU’s will to enlarge to all the 
CEECs. Conducting negotiations with so many applicants would 
complicate the accession process and slow down the negotiations for all 
of them, as it would overload the Union and its negotiating capacities.
To try to counter the negative implications for the excluded CEECs, the 
EU should build a "reassurance framework". This would include 
additional targeted financial transfers in the context of "accession 
partnerships", aimed at better preparing the CEECs for eventual EU 
membership. The pre-accession strategy should include participation of all 
CEECs in cost-intensive Community policies, such as structural measures, 
assistance for agricultural restructuring, and Community programmes. 
Measures should be taken to promote further growth in EU-CEEC trade. 
The CEECs should be granted improved market access for their 




























































































encouraged and the International Financial Institutions should continue to 
support the transition even after the accession of the CEECs to the Union. 
A strengthened institutional framework could be created by extending the 
participation of the CEECs to Community programmes and establishing 
the European Conference, which would provide a forum for dialogue on 
CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs issues at a high political level. More 
radical options, such as partial membership, would be unworkable in 
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Table 1: Interest rates in selected CEECs and EU members
long -term long -term Lending Central Central Lending
government govern- rate Bank Bank rate
bond yield ment bond discount discount
1997 yield rate rate
forecast 1995 (1995) (1995)
Maastricht 8.5
criteria
Belgium 5.9 7.34 8.42 3.0 Czech 9.5 12.80
Republic
Denmark 7.8 8.61 11.8 4.25 Hungary 28.0 32.6
Ireland 7.4 8.30 6.56 6.50 Slovakia 9.75 15.64
Sweden 8.2 9.41* 1 1 . 1 1 7.00 Poland 25.0 33.5
Germany 5.7 6.5 10.94 3.00 Slovenia 10 24.85
Portugal 8.0 10.34 13.80 8.93 Latvia 24.0 34.56
Spain 8.0 11.04 10.05 9.00 Croatia 8.5 20.24
Italy 8.8 12.21 12.48 9.00
*1994
Source: IFS and EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) as reported in The Economist of 




























































































Table 2: The Fiscal Criteria and Inflation in the CEECs
Govt. Inflation External External
deficit/ (average annual increase in debt 1994 debt 1994
surplus CPI) (est.) as % GDP
% GDP ’93 '94 '95 $ billion
1995 (i)
Czech Republic 1.8 21 10 9 10,7 28
Hungary -5.0 23 19 28 28,0 66
Poland -2.9 35 32 28 42,2 37
Slovakia -2.2 23 13 11 4,1 30
Slovenia 0 32 13 18 11.1 15
Bulgaria -7.0 73 87 63 10.5 100
Romania -4.3* 256 136 32 5.4 17
Estonia 0.3 90 48 29 0,186 4
Latvia -2.0 109 36 25 0,364 6
Lithuania -2.0 409 72 40 0,438 7
Croatia 1.7 98 2 2,3 15
Albania 23 10 0. 925 45
* 1994
Source: Van den Bempte and Theelen eds. (column i), Eurostat, BERD, UN/ECE, 
OECD and World Development Report, Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Statistics
Table 3: Exchange rates of CEECs' currencies
National currency per US$, annual average, official exchange rates
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996




Hungary -forint 78.988 91.933 108.160 125.681 156.670
Poland - zloty 1.3626 1.8115 2.2723 2.4250 2.7781
Slovakia - koruna 28.9 30.77 32.045 29.7 30.711
Slovenia - tolar 81.29 113.24 128.81 118.52 134.38
Bulgaria - lev 24.49* 32.71 66.0 70.7 3,201.19
Romania - lei 307.97 760.05 1,655.09 2,033.28 12.040
Estonia - kroon 12.912 13.223 12.991 11.465 0.552
Latvia - lat 0.736 0.675 0.560 0.528 4.000
Lithuania - talona 1.773 4.344 3.978 4.000




























































































Table 4: Changes in GDP, Investment and Unemployment in the
CEECs 
% labour force
Unemploy- Unemploy- Change Growth of GDP Invest-
ment rate ment rate in total ment
1993 1994 est. employ- annual %
ment




Czech 3.5 3.2 -9.6 -0.9 2 . 6 5.2
Republic
Hungary 1 2 . 0 10.4 -26.1 -0 . 8 2.9 2 . 0 12.3*
Poland 16.4 16 -14.9 3.8 5.0 7.0
Slovakia 14.4 14.8 -15.4 -4.1 4.8 7.4 19.0
Slovenia 15.5 14.2 -20.5 1.3 5.3 4.8 8 . 2
Bulgaria 16.4 1 2 . 8 -25.7 -2.4 1.4 2.5 14.3
Romania 1 0 . 2 10.9 -8.5 1.3 3.9 6.9
Estonia 5.0 5.1 -18.6 -8 . 6 2.4 2.5 10.5
Latvia 5.8 6.5 -14.4 -14.9 0 . 6 - 1 . 6
Lithuania 3.4 4.5 - 1 2 . 0 -30.4 0.9 2-2.5 1 2 . 6
Croatia 16.9 17.3 -25.2 -3.7 0 . 8 -1.5
Albania 2 2 . 0 18 -19.4 10.9 7.4 13.4
* 1994
Source: Eurostat, BERD, UN/ECE, OECD and World Development Report, 




























































































Table 5: Indicators of the macroeconomic performance of the
CEECs
public foreign inflation growth Unemploy-
deficit % debt % of GDP ment
GDP GDP*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)**
Czech + + - + +
Republic
Hungary - - - - +
Poland + + - + -
Slovakia + + - + -
Slovenia + + - + -
Bulgaria - - - + -
Romania - + - + =
Estonia + + - + +
Latvia + + - - +
Lithuania + + - +
Croatia + + + - -
Albania + - + -
*Given difficulties in finding comparable data on public debt (the Maastricht 
criterion), foreign debt has been used here.
** The use of + to indicate an unemployment level lower than the EU average might 
be somewhat misleading in that a low unemployment rate could be an indication of 
lack of progress in transition and the fact that much labour remains to be shed.
(1) + public deficit less than 3% GDP
- public deficit more than 3% GDP
(2) + foreign debt less than 60% GDP
- foreign debt less than 60% GDP
(3) + inflation rates no more than 1.5% above the average of the
three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the 
Community
_ inflation rates more than 1.5% above the average of the 
three countries with the lowest inflation rate in the 
Community
(4) + above EU (15) average of 2.4 for 1995
- lower than EU (15) average
(5) + above EU (15) average 10.9 for 1995




























































































Table 6: Progress in Transition in the CEECs
private 
sector as % 
GDP 
mid-1995






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8 ) (9) (10)
Czech
Republic
70 4 4* 3 3 4* 3 3 3 4
Slovakia 60 3 4 * 3 3 4* 3 3 3 3
Hungary 60 4 4 * 3 3 4* 3 3 3 4
Poland 60 3 4 * 3 3 4* 3 3 3 4
Bulgaria 45 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 3
Romania 40 2 3 2 3 4* 1 3 2 2
Estonia 65 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 3
Latvia 60 2 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 3
Lithuania 55 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 2
Slovenia 45 3 4* 3 3 4* 2 3 3 3
Source: ERBD Annual Report 1995 and Transition Report Update, April 1996
(1) Private sector share of GDP mid-1995
(2) Large-scale privatisation
4 more than 50% state assets privatised; 3 more than 25%; 2 scheme almost ready to 
be implemented, 1 little done
(3) Small-scale privatisation
4 comprehensive well-designed programme implemented; 3 programme implemented, 
but design or lack o f central supervision leaves some issues unresolved; 2 substantial 
share privatised; 1 little done
(4) Enterprise restructuring
4 restructuring programme which substantially improves corporate governance in 
operation; strong financial discipline at the enterprise level; large conglomerates 
broken up; 3 structures created to promote corporate governance or strong action to 
break up conglomerates; 2 moderately tight credit and subsidy policy; weak 
enforcement o f bankruptcy legislation; little action to break up large conglomerates; 
1 lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial discipline at enterprise level; 
few  other reforms to promote corporate governance
(5) Price liberalisation and competition
4 comprehensive price liberalisation and price competition; antitrust legislation in 
place; 3 comprehensive price liberalisation and price competition; 2 price controls 





























































































(6) Trade and foreign exchange system
4 few import or export quotas; insignificant direct involvement in exports and imports 
by ministries and state-owned former trading monopolies; almost full current account 
convertibility at unified exchange rate; no major non-conformity o f customs duties; 3 
Few import quotas; almost full current account convertibility at unified exchange 
rate; 2 Few import quotas; almost full current account convertibility in principle but 
with a foreign exchange regime which is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple 
exchange rates); I widespread import controls or very limited and prudential 
supervision
(7) Competition policy
(8) Banking reform and interest liberalisation
4 Well functioning banking competition and prudential supervision 3 Substantial 
progress on banking recapitalisation, bank auditing and establishment o f a 
functioning prudential supervisory system; significant presence o f private banks; full 
interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; 2 
Interest rates significantly influencing the allocation o f credit; I little progress 
beyond establishment o f a two-tier system.
(9) Securities market and non-bank financial institutions




























































































Table 7: GDP per capita in the CEECs and poorest EU member 
states
GDP Pop GNP per head GDP per head




Greece 28,526 10.4 7,700 10,930
Ireland 20,231 9.9 13,530 13,550
Portugal 40,147 3.6 9,320 11,970
Spain 211,542 39.1 13,440 13,740
Czech 36,024 10.3 3,200 8,900
Republic
Hungary 41,374 10.3 3,840 6,080
Poland 92,580 38.5 2,410 5,480
Slovakia 12,370 5.3 2,250
Slovenia 14,037 2,0 7,040 6,230
Bulgaria 10,199 8,4 1,250 4,380
Romania 30,086 22,7 1,270 4,090
Estonia 4,578 1.5 4,510
Latvia 5,817 2.5 2,320 3,220
Lithuania 5,224 3,7 1,350 3,290
Croatia 14,017 4.8 2,560
Albania 1,808 3.2 380




























































































Table 8: Basic data on agriculture in the CEECs 1993
land area Agricultural Agriculture as Population
( 0 0 0 GDP % GDP in agriculture
sq. km.) $ billion 1994 million
Bulgaria I l l 1.3 1 0 . 0 0.9
Czech Rep. 79 2 . 2 3.3 1.4*
Slovak Rep. 49 0.9 5.8
Hungary 93 2 . 8 6.4 1 . 0
Poland 313 5.5 6.3 6 . 1
Romania 238 6.3 2 0 . 2 3.4
Slovenia 2 0 0.7 4.9
Estonia 45 0 . 6 10.4 1.5
Latvia 65 0.5 1 0 . 6
Lithuania 65 1 .1 1 1 . 0
EU 2363 3 18.1
‘Czechoslovakia




























































































Table 9: Total Assistance from G-24 countries to the CEECs, 
1/11990-31/12/1995
(including Albania, Slovenia and the Baltic States)
Overall assistance of which grants
billion ECU % billion ECU %
EU Member States 32.6 37.82% 9.9 11.48%
Of which: 
Germany 14.7 16.98% 3.8 4.37%
Italy 1.5 1.79% 0.6 0.70%
France 6.2 7.15% 2.3 2.66%
UK 0.8 0.97% 0.2 0.18%
Austria 3.4 3.97% 0.8 0.94%
EU total 46.1 53.45% 16.8 19.45%
(EU+EIB+CECA+ 
member states) 
EFTA 1.6 1.8% 0.7 0.78%
Of which: Switzerland 1.0 1.13% 0.5 0.59%
USA 9.8 11.31% 5.6 6.54%
Japan 5.0 5.83% 1.1 1.23%
Canada 1.7 1.99% 1.2 1.37%
Turkey 0.4 0.49% 0.03 0.04%
G-24 Total (excluding IFIs
64.9 75.23% 25.4 29.42%
G-24 Total (including IFIs*
86.2 100% 25.4 29.42
Source: European Commission 




























































































Table 10: G-24 Assistance Commitments
Billion ECU, 1/1/90-31/12/95







Czech 1.5 2.3 0.04
Republic
Slovakia 0 . 6 0.9 0.03
Hungary 4.2 6 . 6 0.1
Poland 13.7 16.1 0.4
Slovenia 0.4 0 . 6 0 . 0 2
Bulgaria 0.7 1 . 8 0 . 2
Romania 2 . 6 4.3 0.1
Estonia 0.3 0.5 0.03
Latvia 0.3 0.5 0.04
Lithuania 0.4 0.7 0.04





4.8 1 . 6 6.4 7.37%
2 . 8 0.5 3.3 3.81%
l.l 0.4 1.4 1.67%
8.7 4.0 12.7 14.67
%
23.3 7.1 30.4 35.25
%
0.7 0 . 2 0.9 1 .0 1 %
2 . 6 1.4 4.0 4.62%
5.2 3.0 8 . 6 9.96%
0.7 0.3 0.9 1.06%
0.7 0.4 1 .1 1 .2 2 %
0.9 0.5 1.5 1 .6 8 %
1.3 0.3 1 . 6 1.84%
Source: G-24 Scoreboard of Assistance Commitments to the CEEC (1990-95), 1996
Table 11: The 1994-99 Financial Perspective
million ECU
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total Community 69,177 69,944 72,485 75,224 77,989 80,977 84,089
Budget*
of which:
Structural funds 19,777 20,135 21,480 22,740 24,026 25,690 27,400
Cohesion fund 1,500 1,750 2 , 0 0 0 2,250 2,500 2,550 2,600
CAP 35,230 35,095 35,722 36,364 37,023 37,697 38,389
* The other sources of budgetary expenditure are: internal policies, external actions, 





























































































Table 12: EU-CEEC Trade
EU Exports
1989 1994 1995 1995 95 /94
bio b io b io %
EC U E C U EC U Share W ar.
Czech 2.39* 7.93 10.12 20.5% 27.7
Republic
Slovakia 1.79 2.69 5.5% 50.1
Hungary 2.99 6.16 6.77 13.7% 10.0
Poland 3.95 10.82 13.50 27.4% 24.7
Slovenia 3.67 4.38 8.9% 19.1
Bulgaria 1.5 1.67 1.87 3.8% 17.2
Romania 0.69 2.65 3.55 7.2% 34.2
Estonia 0.31 0.45 0.9% 46.2
Latvia 0.49 0.63 1.3% 28.8




1989 1994 1995 95 /94 1995 1995
b io bio bio % bio
EC U EC U E C U V ar. S hare EC U
2.56* 6.37 7.86 23.5 18.8% 2.26
1.87 2.62 39.6 6.3% 0.08
2.59 4.96 6.50 31.9 15.6% 0.27
3.86 9.11 11.10 21.9 26.6% 2.40
3.42 3.78 10.6 9.1% 0.59
0.53 1.34 1.76 31.4 4.2% 0.11
2.55 2.51 3.26 30.1 7.8% 0.29
0.27 0.43 62.9 1.0% 0.02
0.72 0.87 18.0 2.1% -0.24




Table 13: The Increase in EU*-CEEC Trade over the 1989-95 Period
% %• % total % total % total % total






















436.0 309.4 0 . 6 2 . 2 0 . 6 1 . 8
Hungary 126.4 151.0 0.7 1 . 2 0 . 6 1 .1
Poland 241.8 187.6 1 . 0 2.3 0.9 1.9
Bulgaria 25 232.1 0.4 0.3 0 . 1 0.3






























































































Table 14: The Increase in the EU Share of the Total Trade of 
Selected CEECs over the 1989-95 Period
% total % total % total % total
exports 1989 exports 1995 imports 1989 imports 1995
Czech 18.2% (EC) 55.1% 17.8% (EC) 56.4%
Republic and 4.6% (Cz Rep.) 5.5% (Cz Rep.)
Slovakia (Austria) 37.4% (Austria) 34.7%
6 .6 % (GDR) (Slovakia) 7.8% (GDR) (Slovakia)
Hungary 24.8% (EC) 63.3% 29% (EC) 61.6%
6.4% 8 .6 %
(Austria) (Austria)
5.4% (GDR) 6.2% (GDR)
Poland 31.8% (EC) 70.0% 34.2% (EC) 64.7%
0.5 (EFTA) 0.7% (EFTA)
Bulgaria 5.5% (EC) 37.2% 10.3% (EC) 38.1%
1.5% (EFTA) 3.9% (EFTA)
Romania* 28.5% (EC) 53.5% 13.8% (EC) 51.3%
3.2%(EFTA) 1.3% (EFTA)
* Earlier data is for 1988
Unless otherwise stated the statistics are for EC 12 in 1989 and EU 15 in 1995. 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), 
own calculations on the basis of PlanEcon and EC Commission, 1994b, (Romania 
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